Securing HTML vs securing HTTP
drummond.reed at cordance.net
Tue Jan 24 11:10:39 UTC 2006
>From: yadis-bounces at lists.danga.com [mailto:yadis-bounces at lists.danga.com]
On Behalf Of Johannes Ernst
>Sent: Monday, January 23, 2006 9:29 PM
>To: YADIS list
>Subject: Re: Securing HTML vs securing HTTP
Personally, I find
little utility in having the identifier I authenticate by as being
precisely the same as the URL for my blog.
>I very much disagree.
>- If somebody types your name (or whatever details about you) into Google,
don't you want the first URL to show >up to be your identity URL?
>- If you leave a comment on somebody else's web page, don't you want a
click onto your identity URL to lead >back to your blog?
>- If somebody tags "you" in del.icio.us, it's likely they will
"accidentally" tag your blog instead of your identity >URL.
>If might be different if we could say "this cloud of URLs are all my pages"
but currently I'm not aware of any >technology that does this ...
Actually, there is one. It's called XRI ;-)
Seriously, this is one of the primary use cases for the abstraction layer
that XRI provides. You can have any number of URLs (at any number of domain
names) all in one cloud under the same XRI.
So it ends out truly representing your identity (and protecting your privacy
at the same time). And can easily be the first search term back in Google.
To demonstrate, try typing "drummond reed +contact" into Google and see what
you get back first.
=Drummond (http://xri.net/=drummond.reed) <======= example of identity XRI
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