OpenID best implementation practices?
Johannes Ernst
jernst+lists.danga.com at netmesh.us
Thu Dec 29 01:14:48 UTC 2005
Could anybody who has already / has attempted to implement OpenID
share best practices? Or does such a document exist already, in which
case I'd be grateful if somebody could point me in the right direction.
More specifically, I'm interested in the following questions:
1) is there a "best practice" that OpenID implementations should
follow in order to avoid replay attacks? I suspect the trick is to
create a Relying Party (aka return_to) URL that contains a nonce, and
track the uses of that nonce?
E.g. if the Relying Party is
http://rp.example.com
use
http://rp.example.com?my-nonce=<random-number>
as the return_to URL in the forward leg of the authentication, and
check the my-nonce parameter on the return leg for whether or not it
was taken already?
Does that mean we could use the same mechanism that we are using in
LID, or is a different approach more appropriate for OpenID?
2) is there a "best practice" for single sign-OUT (not -IN). It is
relatively straightforward to keep track of all the Relying Parties
at which I have authenticated during the current session, but other
than visiting each of them manually and looking for the OpenID Logout
button on each of them, can I automate this from one big button "log
out everywhere"?
3) Is the threat model against OpenID documented somewhere? I'm
missing the rationale for some of the URL arguments, such as why
openid.return_to is returned on the back leg of the authentication
redirects, or why some of fields should or should not be signed.
Of course, everybody might be on vacation ...
Johannes Ernst
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